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Opinions and Expert Testimony
John

w.

Reed

The rules in Article VII of the new Michigan Rules of
Evidence, with two significant exceptions, are identical with the corresponding federal rules. Article VII,
especially in the federal version, has been thought
to effect a significant liberalization of the opinion
rules. Indeed, I have heard and read alarmist statements to the effect that the rules regarding expert
opinion permit courts to transfer some of the factfinding process to experts. Though exaggerated, there
is at least a grain of truth there.
Opinion testimony is now more freely admitted and
plays a much larger role in dispute settling than it
did only a generation ago. Partly as a consequence of
the increasing complexity of facts in controversy and
an increase in technical and scientific questions,
experts are virtually indispensable if court and jury
are to comprehend. Also, more generous use of opinion
is a consequence of a general, if not unanimous,
perception that jurors are more sophisticated than
previously and can distinguish and evaluate opinion as
separate from the underlying facts better than when
the rule against opinion came into being long ago. In
addition, it is difficult to draw lines between fact
and opinion, particularly in the area of lay opinion.
When a lay witness, while trying to state something as
·best he can, uses opinion language-e.g., some adjectives or adverbs-he may be told, "That is opinion, you
cannot testify that way." The witness does not know
what to say next; his tongue is tied. Indeed, that 1s
often the very reason the objection is interposed.
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In the aggregate the new rules represent very little
change from current Michigan case law on the subject.
Nevertheless, they support the slant toward greater
willingness on the part of the courts to receive
opinions of all kinds.
Rule 701 governs the use of lay opinion. It provides, in essence, that the lay person may testify in
the form of opinion or inference if his testimony is
rationally based on his own perception and is helpful
to the trier of fact. For example, testimony would
still be excluded from an individual who says that he
was in his backyard, heard the screeching of tires out
front, heard the crash, ran around the house, and saw
one car over against the curb "that had been hit by the
other car backing out of the driveway." The witness
does not know what happened; he does not have firsthand
knowledge. He simply has seen the positions of the cars
and their condition. He is not better able than the
jurors to draw conclusions from the debris. He does
have firsthand knowledge of the debris and can testify
to that. May he then go ahead and testify to his
inferences--that the one must have backed into the side
of the other? MRE 701 states in clause (b) that the
opinion testimony must be "helpful to a clear understanding of ••• [the] testimony or the determination
of a fact in issue." Surely in the preceding example
every court will determine that the evidence is not
helpful.
The impact statement following Rule 701 in the proposed rules noted that the rule is essentially consistent with existing Michigan law and practice. One word
should be emphasized, however: "helpful." As in MRE 702
where the word is "assist," the test of admissibility
is whether the opinion will help. Previously, the test
of admissibility of expert opinion was often put in
terms of whether the testimony in the form of opinion
was "necessary" in order that the witness could communicate or the juror could understand. If a relatively
inarticulate witness offered to describe a room as
being "a mess," he might be allowed to testify in those
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terms if he was unable to break down his observations
into elements such as torn drapes, pictures askew, and
an overturned sofa. He could testify in that opinionated form in order to communicate what he knew. Rule
701 does not insist on necessity-that the witness be
feebleminded and without alternative form of communication in order to be permitted to express opinion. The
evidence is admissible if it is "helpful" to a clear
understanding.
In the expert opinion area, doctors for example have
long been permitted to testify to the likelihood of
permanence of plaintiff's disability because only a
doctor can provide that information. The fact finder
needs the expert to interpret the data. But Rule 702,
like 701, is phrased in terms not of need but of help,
of assistance, in communicating and understanding.
Rule 702 authorizes the reception of expert opinion
if the court "determines that recognized scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact • • • • " Together, MRE 701 and 702
condition the courts to be more receptive to opinion
testimony.
Who is an expert? Rule 702 contemplates a greater
than average knowledge about a subject matter. The credentials may consist of knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, and the threshold is low. It
is relatively easy to qualify a witness as an expert,
leaving the judgment of weight for the jury.
Under Rule 703, the facts or data upon which an
expert bases his opinion or inference may be made known
to him in any of several ways. They may be "perceived by
or made known to him at or before the hearing." The
expert need not base his opinion on his own perception.
He may obtain his data from some other source. The data
may even be made known to him at the hearing by a hypothetical question or by listening to the witnesses.
The second sentence of Rule 703 as proposed (but not
adopted) followed the federal rule in providing that
the underlying data need not be admissible if it is
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
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particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject. Thus, for example, the orthopedic surgeon
may reach a conclusion as to what is wrong with
plaintiff's leg based in part on the radiologist's
report which is not otherwise admissible at trial for
lack of foundation. The surgeon may testify in reliance
on the report since he and other orthopedists would
rely on it. Rule 703 as promulgated, however, made the
matter discretionary with the court: "The court may
require that underlying facts or data essential to an
opinion or inference be in evidence." It would appear
that unless the court requires it, the data need not
be in evidence. One suspects that where an opinion is
virtually dispositive of the case, the court probably
will insist that the bases on which the opinion is
founded be presented in evidence. Thus, the trial
counsel must be prepared to present the underlying data
in admissible form. Being prepared to do so and in the
interest of more persuasive advocacy, he may as well
introduce that proof. In any event, he cannot afford to
rely on the hope that the judge will not require the
underlying data. Rule 703 is a slight change from prior
practice, but much closer to present practice than the
federal version.
Rule 704, making it unobjectionable that the opinion
embraces an ultimate issue in the case, represents no
change in existing practice with respect to experts.
There is some question, however, about whether Rule 704
changes the rule as applied to lay opinion. Ordinarily,
lay persons may not express opinions on so-called
ultimate issues. But consider a case of intoxication.
The basic facts are that the defendant had the odor of
alcohol on his breath, he was staggering, he was thick
of speech, his eyes were watery, and so on. A lay
witness can testify to those facts, of course. Most
courts, however, would also let the witness say, "He
appeared to me to be intoxicated." Assume then such
testimony in a dramshop case where the issue is whether
the customer was intoxicated when served. Rule 704
makes unavailing the objection that intoxication hap-
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pens to be an ultimate issue in the case. I t may be that
under Rule 701 the testimony is inadmissible because it
is not "helpful"; but it would not be objectionable on
the ground that it is an ultimate issue in the case.
Rule 705, regarding disclosure of the facts underlying an expert's opinion, is also an embodiment of
existing law in Michigan. Consider the following possibility: a party puts his medical witness on the stand,
and the court, under Rule 702, finds him an expert.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.

Doctor, have you looked at the plaintiff's
medical record in this case?
Yes.
Do you have an opinion as to whether his disability is permanent?
Yes, I do.
What is that opinion?
It is permanent.
Thank you, Doctor. Your witness.

The adversary now has the choice to dismiss the witness
with no cross-examination, suggesting that his opinion
is of no importance, or cross-examine him with respect
to the bases of his opinion, thus entering a minefield.
In theory Rule 705 permits the direct examination set
forth, but it is poor advocacy. An expert is ordinarily
not much better than the clarity with which he indicates to the jury how he reached his results. Merely to
offer a bald opinion like the one above, even though
contemplated as a possibility under 705, seems most
unwise.
Rule 706 provides for court-appointed experts, a
novelty in Michigan practice. The court may appoint an
expert on motion of the parties, but it may do it also
on its own motion. The expert may be called to testify
by the court or by either party, and he or she is
subject to cross-examination by either party, whether
called by the court or by one of the parties. Compensation may be taxed against the parties in civil cases
or paid out of the state funds in certain criminal
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situations. Under Rule 706(d) the parties may still
call experts of their own selection, thus preserving
the right of a party to have his own witnesses. But
Rule 706(c) rather reduces the value of that right,
permitting the court in its discretion to authorize
disclosure to the jury of the fact that one of these
witnesses is the court's witness. Undoubtedly, that
disclosure will enhance the credibility of the court's
witness in relation to the parties' witnesses. Rule 706
represents an erosion of the adversary system, but it
erodes an area in which the system has been subject to
a lot of criticism (the "hired gun" expert). Whether
courts actually appoint expert witnesses under the
rule, the potential power to do so may cause trial
lawyers to be more conservative in their choices of
forensic experts. That, many would argue, is a salutary
result of the rule.

